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On the origins of grammaticalization and other types of language change 
 in discourse strategies 
Richard Waltereit, Newcastle University 
 
 
 
1. Explaining language change 
The ultimate goal of grammaticalization theory, as with language change more widely, must be the 
explanation of why the process occurs in the first place, when there is apparently no “need” for it to 
happen, given that language, including grammar, is perfectly serviceable at any given time 
(Traugott 1999b, Waltereit & Detges 2008, to name just a few references) and that any instance of 
language change thus does apparently not provide any improvement over the previous stage. What 
is referred to as grammaticalization is in the empirical domain. Just as with any other type of 
language change, grammaticalization is an empirical fact that needs to be explained, rather than 
being an explanation of anything itself (Roberts 1993). In other words, the core issue 
grammaticalization theory needs to address is, I believe, why lexical items start being used, at some 
point in time, with a grammatical function. 
Researchers in diachronic linguistics have taken vastly varying views on this apparently paradoxical 
situation, also named the “logical problem of language change” (Roberts & Roussou 2003), a term 
modelled on the “logical problem of language acquisition” familiar from language acquisition 
research.  
In generative grammar, the most commonly chosen approach has been to locate change in first 
language acquisition, where, by some mechanism or other, children would infer a grammar from the 
input they are exposed to which is slightly different to their caretakers' grammar underlying the 
same input (Lightfoot 1979, 1991, 1997, 1999, Battye & Roberts 1995, among others). In other 
words, language change would arise as an accumulation of small steps of “misacquisition”. With 
respect to grammaticalization, Roberts & Roussou 2003 and van Gelderen 2004 have argued that it 
is driven not by, as it were, randomly erroneous acquisition but rather by a design preference for 
structure simplification. A variant of this line of thinking is offered by Meisel 2001, who identifies 
bilingualism as a key factor in language change. According to him, transmitting the weaker out of 
two languages to the next generation could be a significant source of misacquisition, which would 
then foster change.  
Core generative assumptions about the language faculty and the fixation of grammar during child 
language acquisition mean that change can hardly be motivated from within the grammar itself. 
This particular theoretical commitment forces generative grammarians to locate change in some 
periphery of the grammatical system, that periphery most typically being acquisition.
1  
In the functionalist camp, answers to the paradox vary more widely, naturally so as these 
approaches are not constrained by the mentalist model of grammar. As grammar reflects usage 
anyway for functional linguists, patterns of use also motivate patterns of change, however in vastly 
varying ways according to the respective model. The functional approach that, to my mind, best 
addresses the underlying paradoxical situation of language change is the invisible-hand-theory 
initiated by Keller (1990, 1994). The upshot of Keller's theory is that languages change not because 
                                                 
1  Another way of locating change in a periphery, differently construed,  is offered in 
Longobardi's (2001) Inertia Theory, where syntactic change is construed as a mere knock-on effect 
of change in some other (more peripheral, as it were) module such as the lexicon. 
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there is any point for them changing on and by themselves, but because speakers, in their desire to 
communicate convincingly, have good reasons to “tweak” the conventions of language, i.e. to use 
forms not for their meaning but for the perceived advantages in communication that they may offer, 
at the risk of not entirely complying with their conventional meaning. For example, according to 
Keller, the prestige decline of the Old High German high-status noun vrouwe 'lady', which became 
the neutral Frau 'woman' in Modern German, was triggered by a politeness strategy whereby 
speakers tended to extend the usage of vrouwe  also to address women of lower social status, 
thereby assuring themselves obvious advantages in the communication.  Likewise it may be 
suggested that with reference to 'physical handicap', diversely abled is replacing disabled, which in 
turn replaced handicapped, all presumably out of a wish to avoid using a perceived taboo 
expression while still ensuring successful reference. In turn, the replacing expressions came to be 
avoided themselves relatively soon, given that the underlying taboo was unaffected. Keller's (1990, 
1994) book provides many comparable examples of language change. The role of politeness for 
semantic change has also been stressed in Beeching (2005, 2007). In other words, the paradox 
referred to above ceases to be one, as successful communication is argued to require the occasional 
breach of linguistic conventions, those “non-compliant” usages eventually turning into conventions 
themselves (even though with a different function than the underlying breaches of convention had). 
The outcome of this is by no means “better” than the situation prior to change, nor need it be.  
This view of language change as driven by, ultimately, rhetoric strategies may seem unproblematic 
for some instances of lexical change, particularly with euphemisms where such changes can often 
be witnessed in real time during a relatively short timespan. However, the same mechanism is much 
less obvious where grammatical change is concerned.  Detges (2000), (2001), (2004) and Detges 
& Waltereit (2002) have suggested that grammatical change, including but not limited to 
grammaticalization, are driven by rhetoric strategies as well, albeit often less easily discernible than 
for those cases of lexical change. In Waltereit & Detges (2007), we suggested that speakers' 
strategies are also responsible for the rise of discourse markers and modal particles. In particular, 
we argued that the function of the target is essentially a by-product of the type of strategy its 
diachronic forerunner was used for in discourse. In other words, current synchronic meaning 
reflects earlier discourse patterns. Taken seriously, this approach means that, if items of grammar 
share functional properties, then the discourse patterns for which their diachronic forerunners were 
used equally share certain properties. In this vein, we should be able to differentiate the discourse 
strategies that eventually gave rise to grammatical items from those that gave rise to discourse 
markers, modal particles, and so on. According to the level of abstraction chosen we may refine the 
differentiation further, i.e., a more granular distinction of grammatical items is expected to match a 
more granular distinction of discourse strategies, etc. 
In this paper I would like to exemplify this model of change with one form of the French language, 
the adverb bien, which has yielded a discourse marker, a modal particle, and a grammatical item, 
namely a concessive conjunction.  
The model furthermore has implications for the notions currently discussed in grammaticalization 
theory, namely subjectification and persistence, as well as for the much-debated distinction of 
grammaticalization and pragmaticalization. We first need to discuss at a more general level how to 
recognize an innovation in language change. 
 
 
2. What sets off grammaticalization? 
2.1. Normal variability of speech? 
Recently, Croft (2010) has challenged the notion popular in grammaticalization theory that change 
is set off by deliberate innovations, which, as the term would suggest, need to be thought of as 
relatively rare. He points out that those innovations are rarely if ever observed. Croft suggests 
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instead that morphosyntactic change, including grammaticalization, is triggered by natural variation 
of lexical choice in discourse. His argument relies crucially on an analogy with sound change. 
Research in acoustic phonetics has found that there is always variation in the production of any 
particular phonological representation, even within the speech of a single speaker and even within 
the same utterance of any such speaker (cf. Ohala 1989). Two instances of the same phoneme or 
other phonological representation are never entirely identical in actual speech. Ohala argues that at 
least in some cases, diachronic sound change originates in this articulatory variation. In other words, 
sound change is the result of the selection of a variant out of the range of variation inherent in 
normal speech, rather than requiring any specific departure from the conventions that are underlying 
those representations. Croft suggests that morphosyntactic change comes about in the same way. He 
relies on an experiment made by Chafe (1980) and colleagues in the Pear Stories. The Pear Stories 
are a film containing no language; they were filmed with a view to obtaining a tertium 
comparationis for comparing the verbalization of experience across languages. Croft noted that the 
variation in the expressions participants chose to verbalize the film scenes often mirrored meaning 
changes in grammaticalization clines. For example, some participants used the verb to walk, where 
others would use to go for the same state of affairs. This mirrors semantic change in light verbs – 
French aller ‘to go’, used as source construction for stems from Latin ambulare ‘to walk’. In other 
words, synchronic variation as a result of speaker choice in verbalizing experience mirrors 
diachronic change. Croft finds that a similar correspondence can be established for a variety of 
grammatical domains. To make the suggested analogy clear: Just as phonetic change is claimed to 
be the outcome of essentially un-controllable natural variation inherent in spontaneous speech, so 
would morphosyntactic change, including grammaticalization, be the outcome of essentially 
arbitrary speaker choice when it comes to verbalizing the same piece of experience. An important 
implication of this is that innovation appears to be a rather ubiquitous and frequent thing – it 
happens all the time in ordinary speech, rather than being rare, as the expressivity- and rhetoric-
based accounts of grammaticalization would lead one to believe. In other words, diachronic change 
in general, not only sound change, is driven by the inherent variability of speech, rather than being 
the result of singular events of innovative language use eventually filtering through the speech 
community. This approach raises the question of whether there is a genuine paradox of language 
change at all, since it implicitly questions the assumption of diachronic stability inherent in the 
formulation of that paradox.  
While I agree with Croft that the fact that the supposed innovations underlying change are rarely if 
ever actually observed somewhat weakens the idea of change being driven by them, his arguments 
are open to challenge as well.  
Firstly, the analogy between sound change and morphosyntactic change seems less than entirely 
felicitous. Natural variation in articulation reflects essentially a varying degree of perfection in 
individuals in meeting a particular given target, namely the phonological representation as 
prescribed by conventions of the language.  This is, Croft suggests, presumably rooted in the fact 
that “the level of neuromuscular control over articulatory gestures needed for identical (invariant) 
productions of a phoneme is beyond a speaker’s control” (Croft 2010: 4).  This however does not 
easily transfer to the kind of morphosyntactic variation that Croft observed. Morphosyntactic 
variability can easily be attributed to the fact that any state of affairs in the world is matched by 
various items and constructions of language, which in turn reflects the basic fact that constructions 
come in vastly varying degrees of semantic generality. Verbalization varies not because speaker 
cannot control it, but because there are so many options available. To choose a simple example, a 
particular car could be referred to as a black Ford Focus, a compact car, a vehicle, a car with a 
Swiss registration number, etc., all of which are perfectly compliant with the language's 
conventions in addition to possibly being truthful characterisations of the referent in question. We 
would therefore expect there to be a certain amount of variation between individuals verbalizing the 
same experience. In other words, natural variation in articulation and natural variation in 
morphosyntax arise for entirely different and essentially unrelated reasons. 
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Secondly, it is not easy to see how even in the case of phonology, change could originate in natural 
variation in articulation. For if indeed this natural variation reflects insufficient “neuromuscular 
control over articulatory gestures needed for identical (invariant) productions of a phoneme”, we 
would expect hearers to be equally unable to replicate the variation thus generated in their own 
speech for exactly the same reasons.  
In a way, then, Croft's argument, as well the underlying utterance-based evolutionary theory of 
language change (Croft 2000), is based on the same assumption of “errors in transmission” as 
source of language change also invoked by generative grammarians, only that for him those errors 
in transmission are located in language use rather than in language acquisition. As far as I can see, 
the sole basis in fact for this assumption is the apparent level of complexity involved in both 
acquisition and use, thought to be “too hard” to operate seamlessly. To the best of my knowledge 
though, it has never been empirically substantiated that any actual change really originated in these 
presumed errors. Why not simply assume the obvious, namely that even though both acquiring and 
speaking a language are amazingly complex, human beings are actually up to it? 
To summarise this point, the challenge that Croft's theory has posed to the paradox of change 
appears essentially unfounded. Conventions of language are there, they are abided by, and failure to 
do so does not go unnoticed. 
 
2.2. How to recognise an innovation? 
While Croft's argument that grammaticalization is simply a by-product of natural variability in the 
verbalization of experience cannot be followed here, the opposite view that language change, 
including grammaticalization, is entirely driven by individual acts of creativity replicated by a mass 
of followers may be too naïve either. A crucial point here is the semantic relation between the 
lexical and the grammatical stage of the form. 
From a semantic point of view, incipient grammaticalization represents either a metonymic, or a 
taxonomic (semantic widening) change. Grammaticalization as recruitment of lexical items to the 
grammar instantiates metonymy; “secondary” grammaticalization, i.e. the change from already 
grammatical to “more grammatical”, i.e. less marked, is, in terms of lexical semantics, semantic 
widening (Detges & Waltereit 2002). To choose a standard example for grammaticalization as 
change from-lexical-to-grammatical, the English going-to future tense is metonymically related to 
its source construction, the verb of movement to go to [verb]. Someone who moves towards a 
certain place in order to do something implies that they will perform that activity in the future. 
Turning to secondary grammaticalization, consider the Old French marked French negation ne...pas 
'not at all’. At this stage, the construction had already developed from its original meaning ‘not a 
step’ (cf. Detges & Waltereit 2002 and many others)  
 
(1) Climborins pas ne fut produme. 
‘Climborin was not a brave man at all.’ (Chanson de Roland, 12C) 
 
 It is “marked” because the proposition must be activated in previous discourse (Hansen & Visconti 
2009). The form has gradually turned into standard negation in Modern French (see Hansen & 
Visconti 2009, and many others). Now, standard negation is logically superordinate to marked 
negation, because the extension of the former includes the extension of the latter. Hence the change 
is, in lexical semantic terms, an instance of semantic widening. 
A type of semantic relation familiar from lexical change, but unattested in grammaticalization, is 
metaphor. One of the most famous example for lexical change based on metaphor is certainly mouse 
as 'computer pointing device', from its earlier meaning of 'small rodent'. Earlier research on 
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grammaticalization argued that metaphor plays a role in grammaticalization, too (Heine, Claudi & 
Hünnemeyer 1991, Traugott & König 1991). However, Detges & Waltereit (2002: 167-168) have 
argued that grammatical changes that involve inferencing, as grammaticalization does, cannot 
involve metaphor because inferencing requires that the extension of what is said and what is 
intended overlap. This is not the case with metaphor. It may, however, be the case with metonymy 
and semantic widening, with ensuing potential ambiguity in early stages. Often, but not always 
(Koch 2004) do metonymies imply an overlap of referents. For example, in the above case of the 
going-to future early examples are often, from today's perspective, ambiguous between a lexical 
verb and a grammatical interpretation. Likewise, the very fact that standard negation includes 
marked negation entails that they may not always be distinguishable. On the other hand, it is the in 
very essence of metaphor that source and target meaning do not overlap, but are starkly different (cf. 
Blank 1997). In other words, a metaphor cannot be ambiguous between a metaphorical and its 
literal meaning.  
What referential overlap means specifically for innovations is that in the early stages it is not easy 
to recognise an innovation as such, since the construction in question could as well instantiate the 
“old” meaning. The very concept of bridging context, i.e. a context that leads from one 
interpretation of a form to another (Heine 2002) relies on the availability of the two readings. In 
other words, an innovation based on metaphor as semantic relation can unequivocally be recognised 
as such, whereas an innovation based on metonymy or semantic widening/narrowing often cannot. 
This potential ambiguity makes it very hard to observe any actual innovation in linguistic, or other, 
behaviour. For unusual, i.e. potentially innovative, behaviour can, in principle, be accounted for in 
two different ways. Either it is unusual because the underlying circumstances are unusual and these 
prompted appropriate activity, in line with existing conventions, but nevertheless unusual because 
the circumstances were so extraordinary. Or it is unusual not because of anything particular in the 
underlying circumstances but because conventions have not been applied in the way they were 
supposed to. Only the latter can count as a genuine innovation.  
To give an example with respect to linguistic conventions: One of the most notable features of 
Albert Camus' novel L'étranger 'The stranger' (1942) is the near-complete absence of the simple 
past (passé simple), which would have been the usual (aoristic) past tense in narrative accounts of 
past events. Rather, Camus uses the compound past (passé composé) instead, which at the time was 
already common for narrating past events in spoken language, but restricted to resultative, i.e. not 
genuinely temporal uses in the written language at the time. Early literary and linguistic 
commentators of the novel tended to analyse this as an adroit stylistic move: the concatenation of 
resultatives created an impression of the sentences being almost unconnected stumbling blocks 
rather than forming a coherent narrative. This was taken as appropriately conveying the 
fragmentation of the protagonist's experience and his solitude, in line with the existentialist spirit of 
the period. In other words, they suggested that the passé composé was the right tense to use because 
it reflected the underlying states of affairs. The choice of tenses was unusual, but warranted by the 
unusual subject matter. More recently though, Camus' novel tends to be viewed as spearheading a 
more and more widespread use of a narrative passé composé in writing, which in a significant share 
of today's fiction is used without any particular stylistic effect attached to it (cf. De Saussure 2006: 
106), i.e. it now appears as an essentially linguistic, rather than stylistic, innovation that changed 
existing linguistic conventions. Incidentally, this would also be secondary grammaticalization – the 
passé composé moving from marked to unmarked status as the default past tense even in writing. In 
other words: Camus' move has been classed as an innovation retroactively, because it was followed 
by similar behaviour; in its time it could not have been ascertained whether this was actually a 
linguistic innovation. If it had not been widely adopted, the early interpretation as a stylistic 
experiment would have prevailed. 
What this shows, I believe, is that often a change in conventions that would be relevant for 
grammaticalization can only be ascertained as such after the event. The basis for this limitation is 
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not only the methodological issue that today's researchers may not have the intimate familiarity 
with the past state of the language required to perceive the more subtle changes, but also a more 
principled one. Contemporary observers, including hearers of the potential innovation, can never be 
certain (except in the case of metaphor) whether they are witnessing a linguistic innovation, i.e. a 
breach of an existing convention, or whether what the speaker says may be unusual simply because 
what they talk about is unusual. This is entirely independent of whether the speaker intended to be 
innovative or not. 
In other words, while language change, in the view advocated here, does ultimately rely on 
individual speakers' creative speech, we do not need to posit that innovative speakers deliberately 
chose to depart from existing conventions only to be followed by a crowd of unimaginative 
imitators. Rather, language change may be more of a collective process, and the respective roles of 
innovating vs. propagating members of the speech community's could be less distinctly separated 
from one another than the classical references to these concepts in Coseriu (1957) and Weinreich, 
Labov and Herzog (1968) might lead one to believe.  
 
 
 
 
3. Different pathways of the same source construction:  
French adverb bien ‘well’ 
 
In the following, I will describe the pathways that one particular item, the French adverb bien 'well', 
has taken to yield a variety of procedural, i.e. non-conceptual, meanings (cf. Wilson /Sperber 1993: 
1). This will illustrate how the outcome of the change is to a certain extent at least determined by 
the rhetoric strategies a given item is used to, rather than by its coded content as such.  
 
3.1.Three contemporary functions 
 
The first procedural use of bien of note here is a concessive conjunction bien que 'even though', a 
genuinely grammatical function:  
 
(2) J’y ai participé, bien que je sois conscient du risque. 
  
I took part, even though I am aware of the risk. 
 
What I mean by “grammatical function” here is that it has bien que's position is syntactically fixed, 
namely at the left margin of a clause. Furthermore its scope is syntactically fixed as well – it has 
scope over a clause. Moreover, it has a function at a propositional (ideational) level. 
Another offspring of bien is its use as a discourse marker:  
(3) GAS  :  non le problème oui c'est c'est la politique d'immigration   
CG  :  voilà oui d'accord bien non parce que votre formule elle peut être ambiguë oui elle 
peut être interprétée hein y en a plein qui disent le    problème c'est l'immigration   
GAS : No the problem, yes, is the immigration policy 
CG: Right, I agree, well no, because what you say may be ambiguous: it may be read, well, 
many people say the problem is immigration itself [CLAPI]  
 
This is, of course, fundamentally different from a grammatical function as its position is not 
determined in grammatical terms – as a discourse marker it is placed at the margin of the stretch of 
discourse it applies to, rather than in relation to a unit that could be described in terms of constituent 
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structure. Concomitantly, its scope in this function is highly variable (Hansen 1998b), i.e. its scope 
is not defined on the basis of the clause or other form-type based unit (as the grammatical 
conjunction would have been). Rather the speaker is essentially free, in their construction of 
discourse, to extend the scope of a discourse marker to what they choose to be the stretch of 
discourse relevant for it (cf. Waltereit & Detges 2007). 
Moreover, on a semantic level, the discourse marker has, as is typical for them and as the name 
implies, a textual or interactional function, rather than a propositional (ideational) one as the 
grammatical function is. In this example, bien is used as a self-correction device –  that is a 
discourse-structuring function. 
The third variant under discussion here is bien as a modal particle in French. These occupy, in a way, 
an intermediate position between the grammatical item and the discourse marker (cf. Hansen 2008). 
In example (3) bien  
 
(4) Vous avez bien reçu mon message? 
  
You’ve got my message, did’t you ? 
 
has an interactional function – it orientates the question towards a positive answer. This is a 
function at speech-act level, which is interactional by definition. Modal particles share their 
interactional function with a relevant subset of discourse markers. However they share important 
properties with grammatical items as well, namely their fixed syntactic position (in French, 
immediately following the finite verb viz. the finite part of the verb) and the rigidity of their scope, 
which is identified with the clause.  
Table 1 summarises the differences and commonalities of the three forms. 
 
 Outcomes of adverb bien 
 Concessive 
conjunction 
Modal particle Discourse marker 
Scope Clause Clause Stretch of discourse 
Syntactic position Fixed Fixed Variable 
Type of meaning Propositional Interactional Metatextual/ 
Interactional 
 
We now need to address the question how these outcomes can arise from the same lexical base. The 
assumption that these are “diachronic outcomes of the same lexical base” implies that they are 
independent semantic representations themselves, rather than being derived synchronically from 
one and the same semantic representation. In other words, with respect to the 
monosemy/polysemy/homonymy debate in semantics (cf. Hansen 1998b), the approach advocated 
here is firmly in the polysemy camp – a stance that is, as Traugott & Dasher (2002: 16) point out, 
virtually necessary when tackling semantic change. 
In the following I will argue that the change is driven by argumentative usage of the adverb bien in 
discourse in a way that takes advantage of the semantic content of the adverb, thus eventually 
conventionalising the pragmatic meaning. 
 
3.2. The rise of the modal particle bien from scalar argumentation  
Hansen (1998b) has shown that the modal use of bien as in (3) above is polyphonous, i.e. it 
incorporates, as part of its conventional meaning, an anticipation of hearer's stance. Incidentally, 
this characteristic justifies the label 'modal' according to Givon's (1995) theory of modality. How 
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does this relate to the lexical meaning of the adverb bien 'well'? Waltereit and Detges (2007) 
suggested that the relevant connection is the use of the adverb bien well in scalar argumentation, as 
in (14): 
 
(5) Et mesires Pierres respondi: “Ba!”, fist il, “de n’avés vous oï comment Troies le grant fu 
destruite ne par quel tor ? – “Ba ouil !”, fisent li Blak et li Commain, “nous l’avons bien oï 
dire.” (La Conquête de Constantinople, CVI, 31, BFM)  
And Mylord Pierre answered: Ba, he said, haven’t you heard about how Troy the great was 
destroyed and in which way this happened? - Of course, said Blak and Commain, we heard 
clearly / a lot about it.’ 
 
The relevant parts of the dialogue are repeated in (5):  
 
(6) Pierre: Haven’t you heard about the destruction of Troy? 
Blak & Commain: Yes, we heard a lot about it. 
 
In other words, Blak and Commain are countering the suggestion that they did not hear about Troy's 
destruction by stressing that they heard “a lot” about it, i.e. in order to convey that a particular state 
of affairs is indeed the case (contrary to what the interlocutor expects), they claim that that state of 
affairs is the case to a high degree. What is at stake in this argument is the common ground – 
whether the fact that Blak and Commain have heard about this event. This is scalar argumentation: 
to make the point that they heard about Troy's destruction it would have been sufficient to simply 
say so; but by making the stronger point that they heard about it to a high degree, the weaker point 
that they really wanted to make in the first place is made by scalar implication. This is “overuse” - 
speakers say more than they need to. Of course this is possible only with predicates that are 
inherently gradable, i.e. that lend themselves to be positioned on a scale. 
Already in Old French, the modal use is conventionalised, as can be seen from uses with stative 
predicates, i.e. those that are not inherently gradable:  
 
(7) Ceste virge dont j' ai retraite Et rimee ceste matere Bien est de Dieu et de sa mere. (Gautier 
de Coinci, 1218) 
This virgin whose story I have told in rhymes is indeed from God and his mother 
 
If the assumption of scalar argumentation as the basis for the conventionalisation of the modal use 
is correct, then we have an explanation for at least some of the formal properties of modal particles 
referred to above. As the scalar argumentation strategy relates propositions expressing states of 
affairs, it is natural that the resulting form (the modal particle) takes propositions in their scope. Its 
syntactic position, namely immediately following the finite verb, may at least be linked to the fact 
that the underlying strategy focuses on the veracity of the assertion, which in turn is expressed in 
the finite verb form. 
 
3.3. Bien in concessive complex sentences 
 
Let us now turn to the concessive conjunction bien que, a genuinely grammatical item. The first 
thing to note here is that the adverb bien 'well' was used, already in Old French, to concede a point 
in argumentation, without being part of an actual concessive conjunction. An example for this 
strategy in discourse is (7): 
 
(8) Dahez ait qui vos oï onques, Ne vit onques mes, que je soie!  Bien puet estre, mes je 
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pansoie,  Que le gué me contredeïstes;  Bien sachiez que mar me feristes. (Chev. Charrette, 
1177, TFA) 
‘Cursed be whoever saw or heard you, even if it’s myself ! It may well be that you forbade 
me the ford, but I was deep in thought. You should know well that you did me wrong.’ 
 
The speaker concedes that his interlocutor did not allow him to cross the ford but dismisses this on 
the grounds that he “was deep in thought”. The relevant parts of the dialogue are repeated below: 
 
(9) [It is WELL possible that you forbade me the ford]  [BUT I was deep in thought.] 
 p        q 
 
The second proposition is introduced with the equivalent of but, a conjunction that has genuinely 
argumentative meaning. According to standard assumptions of argumentation theory (Anscombre & 
Ducrot 1977), but characterises its proposition (q) as yielding an argument whose force outweighs 
the argumentative force of a previous proposition (p). Now, the proposition p, in this case, is 
marked with bien, which, as we have seen in the previous subsection, makes it argumentatively 
stronger than it would be without that adverb. This, however, does not override the force of mais 
'but' in proposition q which is, as it were, working in the opposite direction. In other words, no 
matter how strong the force of p is on and by itself, it cannot outweigh q as long as the latter is 
marked by the conjunction mais 'but' (cf. Haspelmath & König 1988, Leuschner 2006, and others). 
In a discussion of the English concessive element although, Iten (2000, 2005) suggests that this 
word encodes the following procedure (where P refers to the clause containing although):  
(2) Suspend an inference from what follows (i.e. P) which would result in an unresolvable 
contradiction. 
What is interesting about this characterization is that the meaning of a concessive item is explicitly 
described as an instruction to the hearer in processing the text: “[T]he use of although saves the 
hearer the effort of inferring a conclusion that would have to be discarded again immediately 
because it contradicts a more manifest assumption” (Iten 2005: 180). The counterpart of an 
inference to be made by the hearer is an implicature on the side of the speaker. I would like to refer 
to this as “implicature of irrelevance”: 
 
Implicature of irrelevance: Given that the conclusion arising from q is characterized as 
outweighing the conclusion arising from p, it does not matter whether p is the case to a high 
degree (‘well’) or not to a high degree.  
It is interesting to note that this is apparently based on the same scalarity as is the modal particle 
bien. Bien conveys that its host proposition occupies a higher rung on the respectively relevant scale 
than the same proposition without bien. 
Note that in the example above, the concessive effect is not grammaticalised; it is produced 
compositionally from the contributions of the adverb bien and the conjunction mais. Crucially, in 
this configuration, the implicature of irrelevance conveyed by bien can only arise in combination 
with the argumentative conjunction mais 'but'.  
An already grammaticalised use of this in Old French is the conjunction se bien 'even if'.  
 
(3) Le chevalier siudre n' osai, Que folie feire dotasse. Et, se je bien siudre l'osasse, Ne sai ge 
que il se devint. (Yvain, c. 1180, TFA) 
‘I did not dare to follow the knight out of fear to do some folly. And even if I had dared to 
follow him I would not know what had become of him.’ 
 
10 
 
Finally, in Modern French, bien is part of a grammaticalized conjunction bien que 'even if'. 
 
(4) J’y ai participé, bien que je sois conscient du risque. 
I took part, even though I am aware of the risk. 
 
Again, the formal features of the outcome match those of the underlying rhetoric strategy. The 
strategy underlying the grammaticalization of bien que has scope over a proposition, grammatically 
expressed by a clause. The outcome, as a conjunction, has grammatical scope over a clause as well. 
 
3.4. The rise of bien as a discourse marker 
The third outcome of the adverb bien is a discourse marker – a process often referred to a 
pragmaticalization (cf. Dostie 2004 and references cited therein). The adverb bien can be used, 
without requiring any change in its own semantic representation, as an interjection to express 
approval (positive evaluation). The first diachronic step to note is a metonymic change in the 
interjection use from 'positive evaluation' to 'agreement' – things one agrees to tend to be things one 
evaluates positively, without the former entailing the latter though in a strictly logical sense. 
 
(5) (Ha ! Vous voullez avoir plaisance ? Bien, vous l'aurez pour ung taudis, Mais gens qui 
prennent leur aisance Se retreuvent les plus mauldis. (La Chesnaye, 1508, FRANTEXT) 
Ha ! You want fun ? All right, you’ll have it for a hutch, but people who take their freedom 
find themselves the most cursed ones. 
 
The next step in the interjective use is from 'agreement' to 'change of activity'. Again, a change of 
activity in joint action often implies that  interlocutors are satisfied with the preceding activity – 
thence the metonymic link between them. 
 
(6) Finet : Monsieur, si la chose estoit telle Que pensasse qu'honestement Vous la peussiez faire, 
vrement Je vous conseilleroy la faire ; Mais c'est chose qu'on ne doit faire, Je vous pry 
gardez vous en bien. 
Taillebras : Bien, va t'en :. (Baïf, 1573, FRANTEXT) 
F: Sir, if the matter was such that I would honestly think you could do it, then I would advise 
you to do it; but it’s something one should not do; I implore you not to do it. 
T: Enough, go away. 
 
As a last step, the formula bien used to change activities has come to be used, since the 17
th
 century, 
as a genuine discourse marker, i.e. coordinating the joint construction of discourse rather than action 
in the wider sense: 
 
(7) ROY : Tu cognoistras comment sans aucun artifice, Je te veux faire voir la volonté des 
Dieux.  
CHRYSEIDE. Je sçay que cét Hymen leur est trop odieux. 
ROY. Bien bien, nous le verrons, cependant prenons place Au plus prés de l'Autel où doit 
fondre ta glace. (Jean Mairet, 1630, FRANTEXT) 
R : You will see that I will let you see the Gods’ will without any tricks. 
C: I know they hate this nuptial bond. 
R: Bien, bien, let’s see, however let’s take a seat next to the altar where you will lose your 
coldness.  
 
As with the preceding outcomes of the adverb, the features of the contemporary outcomes of bien 
are consonant with the rhetorical strategies they were arguably used for. Actions aimed at 
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establishing boundaries between units of discourse, as with sequences of joint human action more 
widely, are not necessarily constrained by grammatical boundaries and will only incidentally 
coincide with the latter. Likewise, discourse markers, as the involuntary outcome of those strategies, 
have variable scope over stretches of discourse, rather than being defined in terms of grammatical 
constituents. Additionally, they have, of course, a discourse-related, i.e. a textual or interactional 
function rather than an ideational one (as the lexical item they originated from had). 
What we see, then, is that an important subset of functional change is governed by the patterns of 
communication the relevant items are being used for creatively by speakers, rather than by the 
lexical properties of these items themselves. If anything, items lend themselves to particular uses 
more than to others, thereby constraining, to a certain extent, their further diachronic trajectory. 
Table 2 summarises the scope of the underlying strategic use and the contemporary properties of the 
three outcomes of bien discussed in this article. 
 
 
  bien  
    
Scope of strategic use Coordination of 
construction of 
discourse 
Common 
ground 
Proposition 
Outcome Discourse 
marker 
Modal particle Concessive 
conjunction 
  
To summarize, the point being made here is that lexical items, and constructions in general, have a 
certain potential for argumentative or otherwise strategic use in discourse. Speakers may take 
advantage of this, flouting existing conventions of language or conventions of use.  
According to the scope of the argumentative/strategic use, the outcome can be grammaticalization, 
pragmaticalization, or other types of change. 
We can now move on to a discussion of some of the wider theoretical concepts relevant for 
grammaticalization that are at issue under this approach, namely subjectification, persistence, and 
finally the distinction between grammaticaliation and pragmaticalization.  
 
4. Subjectification 
 
Subjectification has been one of the most prominent concepts in research on semantic change and 
grammaticalization alike, most commonly associated with the work of Elizabeth Traugott. The 
essence of the concept, continuously refined over the years (cf. Traugott 1989, 1995, 1999, Traugott 
& Dasher 2002), is the generalisation that meanings tend to move diachronically from the ideational, 
“objective”, to the non-propositional, speaker-centred, interactional, “subjective” domain, but not in 
the other direction, as witnessed perhaps most strikingly in the development of discourse markers. 
While this claim has received ample support, both theoretical and empirical, in a large number of 
studies, there is, to my knowledge, no convincing explanation as to why subjectification arises in 
the first place. 
Under the model proposed here, subjectification is a by-product of metonymic meaning change 
motivated by argumentation. If speakers use forms with ideational meanings for interactional 
purposes, then these forms will take on interactional meaning over time. The nature of that 
interactional purpose depends on what effects the underlying ideational meaning lends itself to, as 
we have seen in the preceding sections. In other words, subjectification as a tendency of diachronic  
change is a very high-level generalisation that abstracts away from the more lower-level tendencies 
of semantic change directly motivated by the rhetoric strategies that are driving them. 
12 
 
A notable exception to the subjectification tendency is what happens in “secondary” 
grammaticalization, i.e. the generalisation over time of marked constructions, un-marking them in 
the process. Examples in point are French bi-partite negation, which developed from marked 
(discourse-activated) to unmarked, i.e. not requiring specific discourse constraints (Hansen & 
Visconti 2009), or the generalisation of the passé composé from requiring present relevance to 
unmarked past tense status, as referred to earlier. It seems to fair to say that in this kind of change 
meaning is actually “de-subjectified” - the speaker involvement implied by discourse activation in 
negation, and by present relevance in past tense constructions, respectively, is progressively 
removed. The resulting standard negation and past tense constructions involve speaker stance to a 
much lesser degree than the constructions they originated from.  
Semantically, these changes instantiate semantic widening, as opposed to metonymy, the latter 
being involved in those instances of grammaticalization that conform with subjectification. This 
reflects a difference in the rhetoric strategy underlying the change: Whereas with the latter, meaning  
is arguably used to imply an interactional purpose, the former are used to take advantage of the 
effect associated with the rarity, or markedness, of conventional use of that meaning itself.  
What this might suggest, then, is that subjectification is perhaps, in a way, a by-product of 
argumentation driving language change, and thus associated with those types of language change 
that result from argumentation, rather than being a genuine diachronic tendency in its own right. 
 
5. Persistence 
Any change of meaning, including grammaticalization, is by definition constrained by the 
requirement of semantic relations holding between the source and the outcome of the change. 
grammaticalization involving either metonymy or semantic widening (not however metaphor), it is 
even more constrained than semantic change more widely.  
Ultimately, research in semantic change, and also grammaticalization, is concerned with the 
explanation of relating earlier and later stages of meaning. That the relationship between the two is 
not entirely arbitrary is captured in the notion of “persistence” - the observation that an item at a 
later stage in the grammaticalization process may retain features from an earlier stage (Hopper 
1991). Recently, Hansen (2008) has suggested that persistence may not only exist in, as she calls it,  
the “backwards” sense familiar from earlier grammaticalization theory, but also in a “forwards” 
sense, namely by restricting the pathways a particular item can take in its diachronic trajectory. As 
she points out (2008: 228), the very fact that semantic maps as conceived by Haspelmath (1997) 
reliably predict patterns of polysemy while excluding others in some domains is evidence for 
semantic change, including grammatical change, being heavily restricted. In a similar vein, Visconti 
(2006) suggests that lexical semantics plays an important role in change. 
Under the proposal made here, persistence expresses the generalization that some conventional 
meanings lend themselves better to convey, by implicature or by some other kind of pragmatic 
operation, particular concepts than others. For example, the concept of motion lends itself to 
implying futurity, as witnessed in the countless instances of grammaticalization that turn motion 
verbs into future tenses. This is facilitated by a relatively straightforward metonymic link between 
movement towards a goal and a future action implied by that goal. By contrast, it is much rarer for a 
motion verb to grammaticalize into a past tense, but the latter is attested just as well. For example, 
in Catalan, the verb anar 'to go' turned into a past tense auxiliary (the perfet perifràstic): 
 
(8) El seu discurs va causar un gran impacte en l'auditori. ' 
It  his talk go:3SG produce a great effect on the-audience 
His/her talk produced a great effect on the audience.' (Detges 2004: 211) 
 
Detges (2004) argues that this function arose metonymically as well, albeit in a slightly unusual way. 
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In medieval narrative writing there was a popular discourse strategy that consisted in highlighting 
important events of a story by focusing on their incipient stages, in, as it were, slow-motion. This is 
evident in recurrent formulae of the kind “and then he goes on to do X”, “and then they start doing 
Y” etc. The Catalan anar 'go' construction can be taken as a grammaticalization of this strategy. It 
arguably took over past tense meaning because those narratives referred to the past even if 
expressed in present tense. In other words, the metonymic link between the past and this discourse 
strategy is, in this case, based in the characteristics of the genre where the strategy was 
predominantly used. We see, then, that while motion verbs predominantly develop into future tense 
markers, they are not inherently blocked to develop into other tenses including past tense. 
For Detges (2004), this suggests that grammaticalization paths, and similar generalizations over 
diachronic trajectories, are not “hard-wired” in the mind or in the lexical meaning of the involved 
items. Rather grammaticalization paths reflect likely associations of concepts in language use; given  
suitable circumstances though, meanings may be pragmatically associated in a way that would seem 
rather unlikely in the abstract.  
In a way, then, persistence is the lexical-semantic counterpart of Eckardt's (2006) “Avoid pragmatic 
overload” principle – it reflects a degree of suitability that some meanings have to be used for 
particular pragmatic strategies while not excluding others in principle. 
What makes the lexical item bien so intriguing, then, is that its conceptual content lends itself to so 
many different interactional uses. 
 
6. Grammaticalization vs. pragmaticalization 
 
In recent years the question of whether the rise of discourse markers is an instance of 
grammaticalization has been debated controversially. Some have insisted that the two are distinct 
processes that should be carefully kept apart (Waltereit 2006). The main argument for this view is 
that the rise of discourse markers as a process simply does not, by and large, comply with the 
established criteria of grammaticalization as put forward in the seminal article by Lehman (1985) 
(Hansen 2008: 55-58). For example, whereas grammaticalization means scope reduction (which is 
one of Lehmann's criteria), discourse markers tend to have wider scope than their diachronic 
predecessors (or, more precisely, not to be constrained in their grammatical scope). The term 
pragmaticalisation has been chosen instead (Erman & Kotsinas 1993). Others, however, have 
argued that the two processes nevertheless share too many characteristics for such a distinction to 
be meaningful (Brinton 2001) and that they can indeed be subsumed under the broader category of 
constructionalization (Traugott 2008). 
To a certain extent, the issue is of course merely terminological – if the scope of the term 
“grammaticalization” is suitably extended, then the rise of discourse markers can very well be 
included in it. Conversely, one can insist on keeping them separate and choosing two different terms 
instead (cf. Van Olmen’s (2010) critique of the debate). The more fundamental issue however seems 
to be why the underlying items take such different diachronic trajectories. The answer that arises 
from the approach taken here is that lexical items develop differently because they are being used 
for different purposes in discourse. According to the level of abstraction that is chosen for the 
description of these trajectories, any two of them will share more or fewer traits. In other words, it 
seems perhaps less adequate to assume that processes such as grammaticalization or 
pragmaticalization are “out there”, with diachronic trajectories conforming to either one or the other; 
rather it would appear that grammaticalization and pragmaticalization are both abstractions over 
diachronic trajectories each of which is ultimately determined by the pragmatic strategies chosen by 
speakers. As the modal particle use of bien shows, intermediate pathways between 
pragmaticalization and grammaticalization are perfectly possible, thereby lending further support to 
the notion that “pragmaticalization” and “grammaticalization” represent generalisations over a large, 
while not exhaustive, number of individual trajectories rather than being types to which those 
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trajectories must conform. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this article I have argued that grammaticalization, alongside with related types of change such as 
pragmaticalization and the rise of modal particles, arises as a side-effect of strategic language use 
by speakers. The outcome of these processes is determined by the strategy the underlying lexical 
items are being used for, rather than being significantly determined by the lexical content of these 
items or by the pre-set characteristics of types of change. 
High-level generalisations that have been identified in recent research such as subjectification, 
pragmaticalization, and persistence are certainly not made obsolete under this approach but they 
need to be complemented by significant lower-level generalisations. 
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